Federated identity » History » Version 2
Tom Clegg, 04/18/2017 06:00 PM
| 1 | 1 | Tom Clegg | h1. Federated identity |
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| 3 | A person should be able to create an account and get a token from a single identity provider, and use that token to access private/protected resources on multiple Arvados clusters. |
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| 5 | Motivating use cases: |
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| 6 | * A user on cluster B shares a project with a user on cluster A. |
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| 7 | * A container running on cluster A reads and writes data on cluster B. |
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| 8 | * A user logged in to Workbench A can search/view/download/upload collections at cluster B. |
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| 10 | Configuration examples: |
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| 11 | * An organization has 5 clusters, but only one of them has user accounts and roles in its database. |
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| 12 | * An on-premise cluster runs containers that use public data stored in the cloud (without mirroring the data locally). |
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| 14 | h2. Design sketch |
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| 16 | Each Arvados client must be able to prove to cluster B that it is authorized by cluster A to act on behalf of a user account which is controlled by cluster A. This must not involve giving enough information to cluster B to act on behalf of the user account: for example, the client cannot simply give cluster B its cluster A token for the purpose of doing a canary query. |
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| 17 | 2 | Tom Clegg | |
| 18 | h2. Protocol ideas |
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| 20 | "SRP-6a":https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protocol |
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| 22 | "Salted tokens": instead of passing its literal token, the client passes the token UUID and HMAC(token, "bbbbb") when sending a request to cluster B (where "bbbbb" is cluster B's cluster ID / UUID prefix). Cluster B validates the request by passing those two parameters untouched to a "verify request" ("no-op") endpoint at cluster A. |