Federated identity » History » Version 6
Tom Clegg, 06/19/2017 07:45 PM
| 1 | 1 | Tom Clegg | h1. Federated identity |
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| 3 | A person should be able to create an account and get a token from a single identity provider, and use that token to access private/protected resources on multiple Arvados clusters. |
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| 5 | Motivating use cases: |
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| 6 | * A user on cluster B shares a project with a user on cluster A. |
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| 7 | * A container running on cluster A reads and writes data on cluster B. |
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| 8 | * A user logged in to Workbench A can search/view/download/upload collections at cluster B. |
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| 10 | Configuration examples: |
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| 11 | * An organization has 5 clusters, but only one of them has user accounts and roles in its database. |
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| 12 | * An on-premise cluster runs containers that use public data stored in the cloud (without mirroring the data locally). |
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| 14 | h2. Design sketch |
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| 16 | Each Arvados client must be able to prove to cluster B that it is authorized by cluster A to act on behalf of a user account which is controlled by cluster A. This must not involve giving enough information to cluster B to act on behalf of the user account: for example, the client cannot simply give cluster B its cluster A token for the purpose of doing a canary query. |
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| 17 | 2 | Tom Clegg | |
| 18 | 6 | Tom Clegg | h2. Protocol idea |
| 19 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
| 20 | "Salted tokens": instead of passing its literal token, the client passes the token UUID and @HMAC(token, "bbbbb")@ when sending a request to cluster B (where "bbbbb" is cluster B's cluster ID / UUID prefix). Cluster B validates the request by passing those two parameters untouched to a "verify request" ("no-op") endpoint at cluster A. |
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| 21 | 6 | Tom Clegg | * Cluster B figures out cluster A's API endpoint by looking at the "site ID prefix" of the token UUID. |
| 22 | * Cluster B can be configured with a lookup table (clusterID→apiHost) to override the implicit {id}.arvadosapi.com |
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| 23 | * Cluster B can be configured to _only_ use the lookup table, i.e., to never use implicit {id}.arvadosapi.com endpoints |
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| 24 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
| 25 | 4 | Tom Clegg | (PA) an even simpler approach would be be to contact cluster A to get a scoped token which only allows "GET /users/current" on cluster A but is accepted by cluster B as an [all] token for that user. |
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| 27 | 6 | Tom Clegg | h2. Adding permissions |
| 28 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
| 29 | 6 | Tom Clegg | There are a few permission-granting cases to consider. |
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| 31 | |grantor|grantee|object|notes| |
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| 32 | |user on site A|user on site A|object on site A|(existing permission system)| |
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| 33 | |user on site A|group on site A|object on site A|(existing permission system)| |
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| 34 | |user on site A|user or group on site A|object on site B|Client creates a link at site B. Site B asks site A whether the grantee user/group is visible to user A.| |
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| 35 | |user on site A|user or group on site B|object on site B|Client creates a link at site B. Site B asks site A for a list of groups user A can see, then checks whether (possibly via one of those groups) user A can read the grantee user/group according to site B's local database.| |
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| 36 | |user on site A|user or group on site B|object on site A|Client creates a link at site A. Site A generates a salted token and uses it to ask site B whether user A can read the grantee user/group.| |
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| 38 | 4 | Tom Clegg | h2. TODO |
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| 40 | 1 | Tom Clegg | Things to address |
| 41 | 4 | Tom Clegg | * how to sync groups |
| 42 | * diagrams |
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| 43 | * mnemonic cluster names / more concrete examples (including who is reachable on the internet) |
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| 44 | 6 | Tom Clegg | * [how] do you get a list of users/groups you can share stuff with? |
| 45 | 4 | Tom Clegg | * clarify what UUIDs look like (some people have A uuids, some have B uuids) |